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Effective research and innovation (R&I) policy in the EU-28: A causal and 
configurational analysis of political governance determinants 
Serdar Türkeli, UNU-MERIT, turkeli@merit.unu.edu 
René Kemp, UNU-MERIT, r.kemp@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
Abstract (150 words) 
Effective research and innovation (R&I) policy depends on the extent to which ideas, interests and institutional 
mechanisms for policy making work together rather than work against each other. In a political governance 
model for effective R&I policy in the EU-28, the separate influence of inter-ministerial coordination, regulatory 
impact assessment extended to sustainability checks, parliamentary committee surveillance, media attention and 
societal consultation is investigated. Interaction effects are investigated in a set-theoretic analysis for the 
econometrically best-fit model. Our results show that the societal consultation, policy-informed opposition and 
sector-informed informal policy coordination are necessary but not sufficient to bring about effectiveness to R&I 
policy. Their influence on effectiveness of R&I policy depends on the combination with either media attention or 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA) extended to sustainability checks. We reached these results with the help of 
ordered logit estimations and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses using 2011-2013 (SGI) data of 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and Lexis Nexis Academic. 
JEL: O10 P52 Z18 C02 
Keywords: Proximate political governance, Research and innovation policy, EU-28, Ordered logit estimation, 
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
1. Introduction 
For stimulating competitiveness the European Commission has introduced an 80 billion euro research 
and innovation (R&I) programme called Horizon 2020. The hope is that the programme, which will 
run from 2014 to 2020, will stimulate the competitiveness of European firms and generate new jobs, 
being two key political goals in the European Union (EU). This programme shows the high policy 
salience of R&I in Europe and the programme complements national and regional policies for R&I.  
In this article, we study the political governance dimension of effective R&I policy with the help of 
ordered logit estimations and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses (fs/QCA) of 28 Member 
States (MS) in the EU, using the data provided by Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2014 for the 2011-2013 
period. The data1 are based on experts’ scores for R&I policy effectiveness and five influence 
variables. The data for media coverage of R&I policy are gathered from Lexis Nexis Academic2 for 
the same period of assessment. With the help of ordered logit regressions and set-theoretic analyses, 
we make a conceptual and an empirical contribution to the study of political governance for the case of 
effective R&I policy in the EU-283.  
 
                                                     
1 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainability Governance Indicators, http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/ 
2 Lexis Nexis Academic, http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/ 
3 Supplementary analyses are also performed with (distal) variables provided by Democracy Barometer, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/ and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
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Theoretically, our model is informed by the “policy work” perspective of Colebatch et al. (2010) 
which views policy workers as essential agents of policy choices, and a Foucauldian perspective of 
power which views power and knowledge as mutually-constitutive (Foucault, 1980; 1982). 
Conceptually, our contribution consists of a framework of “proximate political governance factors of 
R&I policy”. It is called a proximate4 framework because four of our five variables are proximate 
variables, and the fifth is an intermediate, boundary/proximate variable from the perspective of 
governmental action. Empirically, we investigate the influence of the following five proximate factors 
of political governance: inter-ministerial policy coordination, resources of parliamentary committees, 
regulatory impact assessment extended to sustainability checks, media coverage of R&I policy-related 
news items, and the influence of societal consultation, as an intermediate, boundary/proximate 
variable. In doing so, we make a contribution to the study of actor-based political governance of R&I 
policy in attesting a crucial role to the activities of journalists, members of parliamentary committees, 
middle-level executives, governmental high-level expert groups, consultation with societal actors, and 
societal actors about R&I policy choices. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on political governance of effective 
R&I policy, accompanied with our conceptual construction: a system of “proximate political 
governance factors of R&I policy”. In Section 3, we describe the data and hypotheses that are tested 
by ordered logit regressions and fs/QCA analyses. Section 4 offers a discussion of the results for this 
socio-politically communicative and socio-technically coordinative core architecture behind the paper: 
the model of proximate political governance of R&I policy framework.  Section 5 offers concluding 
remarks and an outlook on further research.  
2. The political governance literature on R&I policy 
The literature on R&I policy is dominated by economists, investigating the effects of policy 
instruments on firm/industry-level innovation activities (Mohnen and Röller, 2005) rather than the 
politics of policy choices. Economists have also examined the theoretical rationale for innovation 
policy and conditions for it. The conditions for innovation policy - identified by Edquist (2001) – are 
that there must be “a problem that is not automatically solved by market forces and capitalist actors” 
and “the state (national, regional, local) and its public agencies must also have the ability to solve or 
mitigate the problem” (Edquist, 2001).  For policy agencies to be successful they must possess 
intelligence about the barriers to innovation which are likely to differ across targeted areas: “To be 
effective and not wasteful, innovation policy should be based on identified barriers to particular types 
                                                     
4  A proximate cause is an event which is closest to, or immediately responsible for causing, some observed result. This exists 
in contrast to a higher-level ultimate cause (or distal cause) which is usually thought of as background reasons for the 
occurrence of the phenomenon of investigation. The influence of distal variables such as rule of law, regulatory quality, the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media as general background variables is investigated in an indirect way by examining the 
correlations of such variables with the five proximate political governance variables included in our conceptual model. 
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of (…) innovation instead of on abstract notions of market failure and system failure… this requires 
mechanisms for learning about those barriers” (Kemp, 2011, p. 9).  
Market competition stimulates companies to be innovative, but innovations are subject to market 
selection pressures which lead many innovations to fail. From an evolutionary perspective, the aim of 
innovation policy is “to stimulate the generation of variety through innovation and to ensure that the 
feedback from the selection process does not operate to the detriment of the variety generation 
process” (Metcalfe, 1994, p. 933, based on Smith, 1991). R&D support is the main policy to increase 
diversity but innovation may also be stimulated through fostering cooperation, organising (innovation) 
systems (national ones and technology-specific ones), the development of platforms for learning and 
experimenting, the creation of  strategic intelligence and stimulating demand articulation, strategy and 
vision development (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). To different degrees, governments engage into such 
activities.  
However, political governance is an under-studied topic in the field of R&I policy. A Web of Science5 
query6 returns only 12 published items in the field by February 1, 2015. The most cited political 
governance article relatable to the field of R&I policy is an article on social innovation by Erik 
Swyngedouw (231 times). The second most cited article is the article “Future governance of 
innovation policy in Europe” by Stefan Kuhlmann (60 times). However, for the purposes of this 
article, the most important article is by Susana Borrás: “The Widening and Deepening of Innovation 
Policy: What Conditions Provide for Effective Governance”. In her paper, Borrás (2008) constructs an 
analytical toolbox based on a series of theoretical assumptions about political conditions for effective 
governance of innovation systems and discusses these six political conditions that each of which 
comes with their own analytical criteria for effective governance. These conditions identified by 
Borrás (2008) are: 1) A strategic innovation policy, 2) A positive administrative coordination of 
innovation policy at the middle level of executive departments, 3) A balanced diversity creation and 
market selection, 4) A clear distribution of roles between public and private actors, 5) Policy learning 
6) Public legitimacy and accountability. 
According to Borrás (2008), these conditions listed are in need of empirical investigation because of 
the fact that “solid empirical evidence of positive and negative political conditions would allow us to 
take more assertive stances about policy implications with systemic design effects, and hopefully place 
more emphasis on the overall socio-political dynamics of the ever-changing systems of innovation” 
Borrás (2008). We undertake a test with the help of expert-based quantitative information about the 
effectiveness of R&I policy and proximate governance determinants of it. It should be noted that our 
                                                     
5 Web of Science (WoS): online subscription-based scientific citation indexing service maintained by Thomson Reuters that 
provides a comprehensive citation search by giving access to multiple databases that reference cross-disciplinary research, 
which allows for in-depth exploration of specialised sub-fields within an academic discipline. 
6 TOPIC: ("Political governance" AND ("innovation" OR "research") AND policy) OR TITLE: ("Political governance" AND 
("innovation" OR "research") AND policy) by October 27, 2014 
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study differs from Borrás (2008) in three ways. Following the literature and review of analytical 
conditions, firstly, the conditions are converted into influence variables based on the work of Foucault 
(1980; 1982) and Colebatch et al. (2010) such that we examine the system of influence introduced by 
power and knowledge holders , agents (See Section 2.5 Table 1, Column 2 and 3). Secondly, we take 
an action-based actor-centred approach of proximate political governance (See Table 1, Column 3), 
and thirdly, we concentrate on the importance of the proximate governance influence variables, other 
than ultimate influence variables (See Table 1, Column 4) with rigorous tests with the help of 
quantitative-qualitative approaches (Borooah, 2002; Ragin, 1987; 2000).  
2.1 The relevance of a governance policy: State and market interactions in R&I policy 
In this section, we state the relevance, especially policy relevance of political governance. Nelson 
(1995) indicates the supremacy of market selection over central planning in R&I-related activities. 
Metcalfe (2007) agrees with Nelson that market competition offers strong incentives to innovate but 
sees a positive role for governments to enhance variety generation to counteract variety-destroying 
selection pressures. The creation of incentives to stimulate creation is called the “conduct of conduct” 
by Foucault (1980, 1982). Borrás (2008) stresses the importance of “a balanced diversity creation and 
market selection” that comes with “the enforcement of the principle of additionality by prudent 
diversity creation and evidence that governmental action secures incentives for market selection 
process” as a political condition. Balancing diversity creation with market selection is a difficult act 
given the information problems about the need for innovation support and efficacy of incentives. The 
degrees to which the use of governmental technologies7, such as regulatory impact assessments, and 
the degrees to which the use of technologies of participation by inclusion of ministerial field-
knowledge in order to help to make better policy choices are points for debate. Such instruments and 
instruments choices are always surrounded by information problems as well as problems of legitimacy 
and acceptance8 (Borrás and Edquist, 2013). Innovation systems interact with political systems in 
complex ways. Politicians and agencies for innovation are approached by innovation actors to give 
them support, in making choices they are advised by innovation policy experts on innovation policy 
approaches and influenced by policy agendas, especially the agenda of the ruling party or coalition 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). In the following subsection, we scrutinise this interaction field between political 
systems and innovation systems.  
                                                     
7 Governmental technologies from Foucauldian perspective also denotes “a complex of practical mechanisms, procedures, 
instruments, and calculations through which authorities seek to guide and shape the conduct and decisions of others in order 
to achieve specific objectives” (Lemke, 2007). 
8 Borrás and Edquist (2013) assert that “in advanced representative democratic systems, political parties tend to disagree on 
the type of policy instruments to be chosen and how they should be designed. The same applies to the citizens and the public 
in general, since their implicit or explicit endorsement of policy instruments is crucial for the sustainability and effectiveness 
of the policy instrument. An instrument that is no longer legitimate runs the risk of being popularly contested or falling into 
disuse, hence making its correct implementation difficult. This might compromise its effectiveness and expected results. If 
contestation is fierce and widespread, governments and their public agencies might reconsider the specific contents of an 
instrument, or even the entire instrument as such.” (Borrás and Edquist, 2013) 
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2.2 Political systems and innovation systems: A co-evolution perspective 
Kuhlmann, in his article about future governance of innovation policy in Europe, conceptualises the 
interaction between the state and market as co-evolution of political systems and innovation systems 
(Kuhlmann, 2001). Especially in the context of the EU, Kuhlmann states the importance of political 
system at the national level for R&I policy choices -the unit of analysis in this article- for “national 
political authorities continue to fulfil crucial tasks in transnationally inter-mingled socio-economic 
settings” (Kuhlmann, 2001). He states that: 
 
“…It seems plausible that the institutions of national political systems will in any case 
continue to play an important role, even if the governance of innovation policy in Europe 
becomes more “postnational”: nation states functioning at least ideally as guarantors of 
the rule of law “on the spot” as well as providing legitimization for the growing number 
of transnational political arrangements” (Kuhlmann, 2001). 
 
The range of actors involved in innovation policy is widening. The increasing involvement of societal 
actors in innovation policy has given rise to “politics of information”. In their recently edited book, 
Blom and Vanhoonacker (2014) citing Hooghe and Marks (2001) state that “concern about the 
control over information and expertise is gradually replacing the erstwhile concern with the monopoly 
of the state of the legitimate means of (eventually violent) coercion for the case of Western societies9 
especially during the second half of the 20th century” Blom and Vanhoonacker (2014). Citing Stehr 
(1994), Blom and Vanhoonacker (2014) further state that:  
 
“In knowledge societies, (...) knowledge, rather than more traditional form of coercive 
power, becomes the dominant and preferred mean of constraint and control of possible 
action” Blom and Vanhoonacker (2014). 
 
In relation to R&I policy, Borrás (2008) conceptualises these concerns about governing the 
institutionalisation processes of the use of information and expertise in terms of “governmental 
action(s) conducive to changing and adapting the institutional framework in the innovation system in 
a way that enhances innovation performance in the economy and society” in defining what effective 
governance is (Borrás, 2008). In the following subsection, we discuss the literature on this topic. 
 
2.3 Learning for policy-makers: A heterarchical learning perspective  
Edler et al. (2003) states that new modes of governance and relatedly government would require 1) A 
broader understanding of public policies for innovation (more systemic with special attention to 
horizontal governance relations), 2) A set of overarching goals for horizontal and systemic innovation 
policy, 3) Success factors facilitating achievement of innovation policy goals  (Edler et al., 2003). 
From a knowledge point of view, in the governance of politico-administrative systems and public 
innovation policy, we not only have information asymmetries but also very large uncertainties about 
                                                     
9 “Alternatively labelled as “post-industrial”, “information”, “knowledge” and more recently “risk” and “network” societies” 
Blom and Vanhoonacker (2014) 
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the benefits policy interventions (which depend on the unknown benefits of the innovations). Kemp 
(2011) states that “uncertainty as to the effects of policy instruments call for policy learning” (Kemp, 
2011). Malik and Cunningham indicate that such “learning relates to the explicit openness of policy-
makers to take on board the lessons from the successes and failures of both their own policy 
experiences and those of others” (Malik and Cunningham, 2006). Though, Borrás and Edquist (2013) 
assert that “in the everyday process of policy-making, many instruments are developed as a mere 
continuation of existing schemes, or with poor consideration of the expected effects” 10 (Borrás and 
Edquist, 2013). With respect to what to learn (and forget11), in order to target cross-cutting societal 
challenges12 with technologies of government, Borrás and Radaelli (2010) in a report about the smart 
regulation agenda see a positive role for using tools such as regulatory impact assessment, the 
standard cost model, and ex-post evaluation of regulatory regimes, at national level, which can also 
generate capacity for further coordination across policy problems at international level.  
 
Borrás (2008) contends that “a positive administrative coordination of innovation policy at the middle 
level of executive departments” requires “the existence of explicit and co‐operative mechanisms of 
vertical and horizontal coordination” and “evidence of clear patterns of actor’s interactions explicitly 
conducive to reduce redundancies and enhance complementarity and synergy of governmental 
actions” as the analytical criteria for this political condition (Borrás, 2008). In policy work, “there has 
been a shift from a hierarchical and instrumental, outcome-oriented focus to an interactive, process-
oriented one” (Colebatch et al., 2010, p.230). According to Colebatch et al. (2010) policy workers in 
each ministry/department “spent much of their time negotiating with policy workers from other 
organizations, attempting to find a mutually acceptable and justifiable outcome” (Colebatch et al., 
2010, p. 229). By delving into these details of political and administrative organisation of national 
governments, Arnold and Boekholt (2003) have distinguished four institutional levels in the political 
system that is relevant to innovation policies (Braun, 2008). Braun (2008) places the first three 
political levels as: i) government and the cabinet level, ii) sectoral ministry level, and iii) agency level. 
These three political levels constitute the institutional matrix of political governance that connects to 
both national level systems, such as knowledge spaces, and supra- or international level systems.  
 
In short, this subsection reasserts the importance of national level sectoral/line ministries and 
heterarchical learning across policy fields through the use of sophisticated tools, such as regulatory 
                                                     
10 This is confirmed by Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2008) for the case of EU innovation policy about which they say that 
policies are usually a follow-up on existing policies with a small role for policy evaluations of their effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
11 Stegmaier, P., Kuhlmann, S., & Visser, V. (2012, March). Governance of the Discontinuation of Socio-Technical Systems. 
In Governance of Innovation and Socio-Technical Systems in Europe: New Trends, New Challenges’ International 
Workshop, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark (pp. 1-2). 
12 The societal challenges are social (e.g., youth unemployment), economic (e.g., public debt) and environmental (e.g., CO2 
emissions) and temporal dimensions (short, medium, long-term) are also concerned. 
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impact assessment tools extended with sustainability checks, on social, economic and environmental 
cross-cutting challenges, incorporating academic and industrial expert knowledge into formation of 
exhaustive set of indicators used in such tools in order to assess already existing or prepared formal 
legal acts because of the approach that effective governance can be defined as “a rapid adaptation of 
the formal institutional framework in the innovation system” Borrás (2008). This is a condition that 
comes with “evidence that the formal institutional framework is adapting rapidly” and “evidence that 
recent adaptations in the formal institutional framework have been conducive to the desired levels and 
patterns of innovative performance” (Borrás, 2008). This formal institutional framework can only be 
changed, adapted by laws, regulations and directives. Rapid adaptation of formal institutional 
framework and its performance assessments require a networked regulatory intelligence and cross-
cutting regulatory impact assessments. This network can be based on formal, informal coordination or 
communication, hence we picked our three (formal, informal coordination, communication) influence 
variables relating to varieties of inter-ministerial coordination relying on these theoretical/analytical 
arguments. 
  
2.4. R&I policy, public legitimacy and accountability: Socio-technical and socio-political 
interactions 
The influence of the general public is more indirect and often over morally-charged specific issues. In 
this respect, Borrás (2008) writes:  
“The allegedly ‘technocratic’ nature of innovation policy has been challenged during the 
past decades by social and political unease on topics such as stem cell research, software 
patent regulations, or the risks associated with the release of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs)” (Borrás, 2008). 
However, social and political concerns of citizens not only relate to social and political issues that 
comes with introduction of risky innovations, they also relate to basic calculations of efficiency or 
effectiveness of public spending, whether the promised targets are reached or not, failures and success 
in policy choices, several governmental decisions relating to education, vocational training, higher 
education scholarships and so on. Van Asselt and Vos (2008) indicates that “the innovation process is 
a complex social and economic process  meaning that the social sustainability of innovation process is 
inevitably associated with the ways in which popular criticism and concerns about innovation-related 
phenomena are politically dealt with” (Van Asselt and Vos, 2008). According to Borrás (2008), the 
political condition of public legitimacy and accountability comes with “the existence of well‐endowed 
participatory frameworks in the innovation policy‐making process complementing formal democratic 
channels” and “evidence of political accountability in innovation‐related matters” (Borrás, 2008).  
Formal democratic channels are proximate, and driven by the debates in parliamentary committees, 
parliamentary activities in monitoring and opposing to the governmental decision thanks to democratic 
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discourse and practice; and by media reporting activity in terms of political reporting (publicising the 
governmental decisions) to the general public, to the electorate. Although the content of the debates 
could vary, the most important one is “a clear distribution of roles between public and private 
actors”, that comes with “extended formalized contractual agreement between partners in complex 
and ‘grey’ zone of public‐private partnerships” and “evidence of conditionality of public involvement 
in these types of public‐private interactions” (Borrás, 2008). Depending on their visibility, these 
criteria are accountable to evaluation by parliamentary committees (debating the grey zones and 
conditionality criteria of public involvement) and media (publicising what is going on with respect to 
these criteria) have an immediate, competitive (rival parties) and communicative (media) eye, 
surveillance, on the policy work of governments.  
According to Borrás (2008), the political condition of “a strategic innovation policy” comes with “the 
existence of an explicit political vision and priority‐setting” and “evidence that the vision and 
priorities are transposed to the choice, design and implementation of innovation policy instruments” 
(Borrás, 2008). From the perspective of political governance and policy work, this can be extended in 
the following way. In democratic settings at national level and at the EU-level, political visions and 
priorities can vary amongst different political parties, competitive ideas and interests of rival political 
parties can exist even if these parties are not in the power, they can be in the parliament and 
parliamentary committees (De Ruiter, 2010; 2013; 2014; Borrás and Radaelli , 2014). The ways of 
translation of political vision and priorities to the choice, design and implementation can also vary 
with respect to the several political options available about the characteristics of technologies of 
participation and governmental technologies (Foucault, 198o; 1982). Governmental technologies here 
denotes “a complex of practical mechanisms, procedures, instruments, and calculations through 
which authorities seek to guide and shape the conduct and decisions of others in order to achieve 
specific objectives” (Lemke, 2007).  
2.5 Our framework: Proximate political governance determinants of R&I policy  
Our model of effective governance differs from the model of Borrás (2008), which is conceptually 
richer but not prone to (econometric or set-theoretic) one-to-one operationalisation, preventing us from 
using it in a direct way in our regression and set-theoretical analyses. However, following our review 
and theoretical/analytical mapping, as proximate factors other than remote factors inside the national 
political systems relating to R&I policy in the EU-28, we investigate the role of five “governance” 
determinants of effective R&I policy. Each condition -primarily driven by institutional or agential 
actors- can be considered as of the most proximate influence variables for the policy operations of 
governments. In our models of proximate governance, we have two variables of external surveillance 
(media and parliamentary committees/socio-political), and three variables of self-surveillance 
(assessment and scrutiny by politico-administrative coordination, and societal consultation). These 
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determinants are called governance determinants because each of them involves particular 
mechanisms through which not only knowledge but also concerns and voices are brought to bear on 
government policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Of the five variables, resources of parliamentary 
committees enabling monitoring and opposing governmental decisions, and media informing citizens 
on the policy decisions of governments (and offering a platform for raising awareness and discussing 
them) constitute the most proximate and the most immediate sources of pressure that governments 
have to deal with. The surveillance of governmental policy actions (by political opponents in 
parliamentary committees and media) is believed to have a very important influence on government 
policy in that it necessitates a reaction from responsible ministers. The influence of using advanced 
regulatory impact assessments extended to sustainability checks and capacity to coordinate policy 
action across ministries are also very proximate and therefore considered important for the formulation 
of effective policies and adjustment of policy proposals in response to sophisticated sectoral 
knowledge and overall sustainability pressures and demands coming from the societal ideas and 
interests. Therefore, our model offers a systemic interplay between ideas, interests and institutions 
(Hall, 1997). 
Table 1 – Mapping the theoretical backgrounds of variable selection 
Political conditions provide for  
effective governance  
(Borrás, 2008) 
Mapped into 
theoretical 
background 
Proximate 
Political 
Governance 
(Our constructs) 
Remote  
Political  
Governance 
(World Bank) 
“A positive administrative coordination 
of innovation policy at the middle level 
of executive departments” (OECD, 
2005; Braun, 2008) 
 
“A strategic innovation policy” 
Technologies of 
participation 
(Foucault; 1980; 
1982) 
 
Policy work 
(Colebatch, Hoppe 
and Noordegraaf, 
2010) 
 
 
Governmental 
technologies 
(Foucault, 1980; 
1982) 
 
 
Interaction between 
Socio-technical and 
Socio-political 
governance  
(Kooiman, 1993; 
Tsakatika, 2007)  
Administrative 
 (formal, informal, 
communicative) 
coordination 
 
Inclusion of civil 
society, academics, 
business into policy 
process 
(Societal consultation) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Quality 
 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Voice and 
Accountability 
 
“Policy learning” (Malik and 
Cunningham, 2006) 
 
“A balanced diversity creation and 
market selection” (Nelson, 1995; 
Metcalfe, 2007) 
 
Regulatory impact 
assessment extended to 
sustainability checks  
 
“A clear distribution of roles between 
public and private actors” 
 
“Public legitimacy and accountability” 
(Van Asselt and Vos , 2008)  
National Parliamentary 
Committees 
 
National Media 
 
In Table 1 above, “A positive administrative coordination of innovation policy at the middle-level of 
executive departments” (OECD, 2005; Braun, 2008) is mapped as one of the technologies of 
participation (Foucault; 1982). We analysed this administrative coordination aspect with respect to 
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three varieties: formal, informal coordination or communication-based coordination13. Formal 
“inclusion of sectorial line ministries into policy proposals” is an instance of formal coordination, 
while “complementary informal inter-ministerial coordination” is an instance of informal mechanisms 
in politico-administrative coordination; “vertical and horizontal policy communication” concentrates 
on the discursive coherency in policy action. All variables are further discussed in Section 3.  
 
3. Data, Hypotheses and Methods  
3.1 Data  
The main body of the data is of Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainability Governance Indicators (SGI) 
201414, assessing a period of two years, beginning May 1, 2011 and ending May 15, 2013 and consists 
of comparability between earlier review periods dating back to January 2005, through experts’ 
exclusively focusing on developments within the period under investigation15. There are limitations to 
data, however we think that we can reasonably capture all of these limitations by the choice of 
methods of analyses and strong theoretical arguments about political saliency of R&I and R&I policy 
as it is indicated in the literature (Borrás, 1999; Braun, 2008; OECD, 1996; 2005a; 2005b).  
One limitation of data is that they are based on country experts’ subjective judgements about policy 
effectiveness and policy governance aspects16. The second limitation is that 28 countries of the EU 
constitute a small N (as sample size) from the point of view of regression analysis. The third limitation 
is that the explanatory variables/conditions are of generic kind not R&I policy-specific, meaning that 
they are not measured specifically for the R&I policy, such as resources of parliamentary committees 
to monitor and oppose governmental action in R&I-related topics, but they are more of an overall 
assessment of governance capacity. For the purposes of our study they are the best data available. For 
our variables there are no good objective-measures, efforts have been made to ensure the validity of 
these expert assessments. The assessments of the SGIs Expert Network undergo a six-stage peer 
review within their concise framework which ensures the validity and reliability of these expert 
assessments that also asks for factual evidence behind this qualitative assessment17. As for the sample 
size, whereas N of 28 countries is small for regression-based analysis, it is rather large for set-theoretic 
analysis. Regarding the general nature of the determinants of R&I policy effectiveness, we can 
reasonably expect that R&I policies are more scrutinised to evaluation in countries where policy 
                                                     
13 Please see March and Olsen (2006) for the role of formal and informal institutions and Schmidt (2008) for discursive 
institutions.  
14 The SGI is a platform built on a cross-national survey of governance that identifies reform needs in 41 EU and OECD 
countries. http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/ all values are between 1 and 10. The SGI data relies on a combination of 
qualitative assessments by country experts http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Expert_Network and quantitative data drawn 
from official sources. 
15ibid 
16Source: SGI Network http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/FAQ 
17ibid 
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discussions by parliamentary committees is common and advanced methods of Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (RIA) are being used.  Varieties of administrative coordination and the use of RIA tools with 
sustainability checks as generic traits can be expected to equally apply to R&I policy. Indeed there is a 
great deal of evidence that R&I policy often and primarily involves horizontal and vertical 
coordination (Borrás, 2008; Braun, 2008; OECD, 1996; 2005a; 2005b).  
3.1.1. The dependent variable / the outcome 
The dependent (ordinal) variable is “Research and Innovation Policy Effectiveness” (RIPE) which a 
measure of the extent (1-10) to which R&I policy supports technological innovations that fosters the 
creation and introduction of new products and enhanced productivity18. See appendix for tabulation of 
dependent variable. 
3.1.2 Explanatory variables / the conditions 
Abbreviations are as follows: Inclusion of Sectorial Line Ministries (ISLM); Complementary Informal 
Inter-ministerial Coordination (CIIC); Policy Communication (VHPC); Media Attention/Coverage of 
R&I Policy and Politics (MCRIPP); Parliamentary Committees’ Resources (PACR); RIA with 
Sustainability Checks (RIASC); Societal Consultation (SPEC): 
3.1.2.1 Inclusion of Sectorial Line Ministries (ISLM) is a measure of the extent (1-10) to which 
sectoral/line ministries formally involve in the government office/prime minister’s office (GO/PMO) 
in the preparation of policy proposals, whether sectoral/line ministries involve the GO/PMO in the 
preparation of policy proposals at government – ministry executive interface. 
“Inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries at policy 
proposal level” 19 
This indicator20 is taken as a pressure on R&I policy for existence of ever-getting-sophisticated, cross-
cutting sectoral knowledge that is needed to formulate R&I policy. In the political governance matrix, 
sectoral/line ministries, from the perspective of bottom-up modern governance, are the closest units to 
the field-knowledge (Kooiman, 1993; Hoff, 2003; Braun; 2008) therefore, very proximate in 
contributing into governmental policy work. For instance, in the Netherlands, “Generally, the initiative 
by a line ministry to start drafting new legislation or a white paper is rooted in the government policy 
accord, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to 
one or two line ministries. With complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable 
jockeying for position among the various line ministries” (SGI, 2014). 
                                                     
18Source: SGI Network http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2014/basics/SGI2014_Codebook.pdf 
19 ibid 
20 Relates to Section 2.1 relevance of a governance policy, Section 2.2 co-evolution of knowledge, Section 2.3 policy makers’ 
heterarchical learning 
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H1: The more the line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the 
preparation of policy proposals, the more likely a research and innovation policy that effectively 
supports innovations is designed. 
3.1.2.2 Complementary Informal Inter-ministerial Coordination (CIIC) is a measure of the extent 
(1-10) to which informal coordination mechanisms (e.g., coalition committees, informal meetings 
within government or with party groups, informal meetings across levels of government) effectively 
complement formal mechanisms of inter-ministerial coordination. Inter-ministerial coordination 
fosters heterarchical learning, and is a proximate influence factor on policy work.  
“How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal 
mechanisms of inter-ministerial coordination?” 21 
For instance, in Finland “Inter-sectoral coordination has generally been perceived as an important 
issue, but rather few institutional mechanisms have in fact been introduced. One of these is the so-
called iltakoulu, or evening session, which is an unofficial negotiation session of the Cabinet. To a 
considerable extent, though, coordination proceeds effectively through informal mechanisms.” (SGI, 
2014) 
H2: The more the informal coordination effectively complements formal mechanisms of inter-
ministerial coordination between layers of government, the more likely a research and innovation 
policy that effectively supports innovations is designed. 
3.1.2.3 Policy Communication (VHPC) is a measure of the extent (1-10) to which whether the 
government achieves coherent policy communication by (a) effectively coordinating the 
communication activities of ministries and (b) sending messages that are factually coherent with the 
government’s plans. 
“To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?” 22 
Government coordinates policy communication to ensure ministerial statements align with 
government strategy. For instance, in Lithuania, “Prime Minister Butkevičius has himself publicly 
made contradictory statements on such politically important issues as tax reform or the future of 
nuclear power in Lithuania, probably reflecting the diversity of opinions within his party and the 
ruling coalition”(SGI, 2014). 
H3: The more coherent the policy communication between layers of government is, the more likely 
a research and innovation policy that effectively supports innovations is designed. 
                                                     
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
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3.2.2.4 RIA with Sustainability Checks (RIASC) is an indicator of the extent (1-10) to which the 
government conducts effective sustainability checks within the framework of regulatory impact 
assessments. 
“Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set 
of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) 
and track impacts from the short- to long-term. Effective sustainability checks fulfil three 
criteria. First, they are integrated into RIAs in order to form a common basis for 
decision-making rather than standing on their own. Second, they draw on an exhaustive 
set of impact indicators addressing social (e.g., youth unemployment), economic (e.g., 
public debt) and environmental (e.g., CO2 emissions) issues. Third, they analyse the 
impacts on such indicators in the short-, mid-, and long-term.” 23  
Regulatory impact assessment extended to sustainability checks helps policy makers to consider the 
likely impacts of policies, not only the positive outcomes but also possible negative outcomes in terms 
of employment, environmental effects and tax revenues.  The assessment of the potential impacts of 
existing and prepared legal acts is a proximate influence variable. The existence of RIA with 
sustainability checks acts as a counterbalance to favouritism and privileges in access to government, in 
that the pros and cons of policy acts as explicitly considered. The influence of RIA on government 
policy is disputed in an evaluation of the OECD, saying that “much remains to be done to cement RIA 
as an integral part of the policy decision-making process”24 as well as much remains to be cement 
concerns of sustainability as an integral part of RIA in decision making25. 
H4: The more the governments systematically assess the potential sustainability impacts of existing 
and prepared legal acts,  the more likely a research and innovation policy that effectively supports 
innovations is designed. 
3.2.2.5 Parliamentary Committees’ Resources (PACR) is an indicator of the degree (1-10) to which 
members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government 
activity effectively. 
“In order to effectively monitor government activity, members of parliament must possess 
the resources to obtain self-produced or independent information and expertise. 
Resources like deputy expert staff, or administrative support staff (e.g., parliamentary 
libraries or parliamentary research units) as well as monetary allowances for the 
commission of independent research are key preconditions for effective monitoring.” 26 
This indicator is considered an important influence variable for policy, including R&I policy. Well-
informed criticisms and suggestions for policy from parliamentary committees, especially when 
picked up by the media, can be expected to constitute an important source of influence on government 
policy in requiring a response from responsible authorities, forcing them to ponder policy alternatives. 
                                                     
23 ibid 
24 Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42047618.pdf 
25 Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Sustainability%20in%20impact%20assessment%20SG-
SD%282011%296-FINAL.pdf 
26 ibid 
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On top of these in-house (national) parliamentary committee resources, a case relating to this variable 
is given where parliamentary actors from different European countries come together and reflect on 
R&I policy. These actors require in-house resources to effectively participate into exchange of views 
on international level. For instance, on April 8, 2014, the PACITA27 partners organised a 2nd 
Parliamentary debate in Lisbon, where the project partners and other interested institutions from 
various spheres participated together with parliamentarians from the PACITA partner countries in 
order to discuss current issues regarding technology assessment28.  
H5: The more the Parliamentary Committees’ Resources enable effective monitoring of government 
activity by members of parliament, the more likely a research and innovation policy that effectively 
supports innovations is targeted to be designed by governments 
3.2.2.5. Media Coverage of R&I Policy and Politics (MCRIPP) is a variable of media coverage in 
R&I policy and politics. The number of news items on the theme of “R&I policy and politics” is 
gathered for each Member State from Lexis Nexis29 database for the period of 1 May 2011-15 May 
2013. This period is also the assessment period of the other variables in our analysis. 
“To what extent do the media provide information to broader public under the theme of 
R&I policy and politics?” 
This indicator is considered to constitute an influence factor on R&I policy for information about R&I 
policy incorporating a dimension of politics is being publicised by media and circulated about 
governments’ R&I policy-related decisions. Much of the influence of the journalists, in democracies, 
is through the media, in making the public aware of the effects of government policies and offering 
channels for people to express their views about the policies responsible for the effects. Media has 
further role in acting as a surveillance mechanism on governmental decisions, at the same time, it 
informs citizens about policy, raises policy awareness, and increases potential policy response from 
broader public. A case of this variable can be exemplified as follows. Different societal actors indicate 
views on a governmental decision on R&I policy in a news item titled “George Osborne pledges extra 
£600m for science to stimulate growth” by The Guardian30. George Osborne, a politician; David 
Willets, a minister; Imran Khan, a director of a civil society campaign; Paul Nurse, president of Royal 
Society, and appreciation and critics from scientific community in response to an R&I policy 
intervention is publicised by the newspaper. 
H6: The more the media provide news items enabling the broader public to be aware of 
governmental R&I policy decisions, the more likely a research and innovation policy that effectively 
supports innovations is targeted to be designed by governments 
                                                     
27 PACITA (“Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology Assessment”) is an international project financed by the 7th 
Framework Programme, Science in Society. Project lasts four years – from April 2011 till March 2015. 
http://pacita.strast.cz/en/about-the-project 
28 ibid 
29 Source: Lexis Nexis, http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/ 
30 Source: The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/dec/05/george-osborne-science-stimulate-growth 
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3.2.2.7 Societal Consultation (SPEC) is a measure of the extent (1-10) to which how successfully the 
government consults with societal actors such as trade unions, employers’ associations, leading 
business associations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups in 
preparing its policy. For a quantitative discussion on the selection of this variable with respect to distal 
variables, see appendix and/or supplementary file. 
“How successful is the government in exchanging of views and information (beginning at an 
early stage of policy development and continuing through to policy implementation) that 
increases the quality of government policies and induces societal actors to support them?”31  
For instance in Denmark, “there is a long tradition of involving economic and social actors at all 
stages of the policy cycle, even sometimes in the implementation phase. Both formally and informally, 
there are good contacts between the government administration and the main interest organisations 
(e.g., trade unions, employers, various business organisations and NGOs), as well as heads of major 
companies. Interest organisations provide important information for politicians and civil servants. 
While corporatism has changed over the years, it still exists in Denmark32” (SGI, 2014). 
H7: The more the government is successful in societal consultation at early stages and in 
implementation phases, the more likely a research and innovation policy that effectively supports 
innovations is present. 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
 
Research and Innovation Policy Effectiveness 
 
 
28 
 
5.321 
 
1.982 
 
3.000 
 
9.000 
Inclusion of Sectorial Line Ministries (ISLM) 28 6.857 2.206 3.000 10.000 
Complementary Informal Inter-ministerial Coordination 
(CIIC) 
28 6.893 1.912 3.000 10.000 
Policy Communication (VHPC) 
 
28 6.071 2.159 2.000 10.000 
RIA with Sustainability Checks (RIASC) 28 4.607 2.601 1.000 10.000 
Societal Consultation (SPEC) 28 5.893 2.132 2.000 10.000 
Parliamentary Committees’ Resources (PACR) 
 
28 6.643 2.094 2.000 9.000 
Media Coverage of R&I Policy and Politics (MCRIPP) 28 67.714 123.758 2.000 607.000 
      
We ran several tests for data quality (See appendix for STATA outputs33). No substantial collinearity 
is observed for the system of variables. As we expected, highly correlated three varieties of 
administrative coordination have better be separately incorporated into models to avoid 
multicollinearity (Condition numbers above 15). 
                                                     
31Source: SGI Network http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2014/basics/SGI2014_Codebook.pdf 
32Henning Jorgensen, Consensus, Cooperation and Conflict: The Policy Making Process in Denmark, 2002. 
33These are Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality, Spearman Correlations, Collinearity Diagnostics I - No individual VIF 
value is above 10 or tolerance below 0.1, Collinearity Diagnostics II - No condition number above 15 or 30.  
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3.2.1 Method I: Ordered Logit Econometric Estimations and Results 
Ordered logit estimations have been developed for studying the relationship between an ordinal or 
categorical dependent variable and the independent variables. Our R&I policy effectiveness indicator, 
the dependent variable, is an ordinal variable. The actual values taken on by the dependent variable are 
irrelevant, except that larger values are assumed to correspond to "higher" outcomes34. Table 3 below 
shows the ordered logit regression results keeping four influence variables fixed and controlling for 
varieties of inter-ministerial coordination, namely formal, informal coordination and communicative 
coordination.  
Table 3 – Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Research and Innovation Policy Effectiveness Formal 
Coordination 
Informal 
Coordination 
Communicative 
Coordination 
Influence Variables: 
Line Ministries Inclusion to Policy Proposals  0.377   
 (0.249)   
Informal Inter-ministerial Coordination   0.428*  
  (0.237)  
Policy Communication    0.593* 
   (0.314) 
Societal Consultation 0.874*** 0.784*** 0.836*** 
 (0.274) (0.265) (0.259) 
RIA extended to Sustainability Checks  0.420** 0.418*** 0.281* 
 (0.183) (0.162) (0.155) 
Parliamentary Committees’ Resources 0.546** 0.503* 0.749** 
 (0.26) (0.257) (0.36) 
Media Coverage of Government RI Policy Decisions 0.007** 0.007** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
cut1 9.809*** 9.446*** 11.31*** 
_cons (2.636) (2.107) (3.915) 
cut2 12.81*** 12.66*** 14.52*** 
_cons (2.866) (2.676) (4.054) 
cut3 14.78*** 14.42*** 16.42*** 
_cons (3.351) (2.909) (4.361) 
cut4 16.29*** 15.70*** 17.96*** 
_cons (3.566) (3.009) (4.588) 
cut5 18.24*** 17.51*** 20.14*** 
_cons (3.508) (2.869) (4.663) 
cut6 20.09*** 19.45*** 22.28*** 
_cons (3.864) (3.117) (5.011) 
Omodel test: Approximate likelihood-ratio test of 
proportionality of odds across response categories (all 
above 10%): 
chi2(25) =   
32.38 
Prob > chi2 =   
0.1473 
chi2(25) =   
33.71 
Prob > chi2 =   
0.1142 
chi2(25) =   
  33.53 
Prob > chi2 =   
0.1184 
Member States 28 28 28 
Standard robust errors in parentheses / Star-levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                     
34Source: STATA Corporation:  Ordered Logit, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rologit.pdf 
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Results of the ordered logit analyses given in Table 3 indicate that as hypothesised, individually, all 
variables are statistically significant for proximate political governance models incorporating informal 
coordination and communicative coordination35. The higher the number of R&I-related news items, 
media attention (Odds ratio: 1.007), the higher the use of RIA tools with sustainability checks (Odds 
ratio: 1.519), the higher the complementary informal inter-ministerial coordination (Odds ratio: 
1.535), the higher the availability of parliamentary committee resources (Odds ratio: 1.654) and the 
higher the openness of governments to policy entrepreneurs (Odds ratio: 2.191), the more likely, a 
higher probability that an effective R&I policy is observed. Of the greatest marginal effect is for 
societal consultation, followed by parliamentary committees’ resources, complementary informal 
coordination and sustainability checks extension, followed by media attention36. The high positive 
effect of openness of government to external societal policy actors/entrepreneurs is a notable result. In 
the following section, we analyse multi-way interactions with a set-theoretic analysis for Model No 2: 
complementary informal administrative coordination variant of proximate political governance. 
3.2.2 Method II: Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) and Results 
The configurational influence of the five conditions is investigated with the help of fs/QCA developed 
by Ragin (1987; 2008a; 2008b). Fs/QCA analyses (with respect to presence and absence of the 
outcome) are based on set-relations of the conditions instead of correlations between them (Grofman 
and Schneider, 2010). Set-relations here denote whether comparative values of conditions consistently 
higher or lower than each other indicating a super/sub-set relation. Fuzzy-sets are useful in calibrating 
partial memberships in sets without abandoning the core set-theoretic principles, such as subset 
relations (Pustovrh and Jaklic, 2014). We apply fs/QCA analysis to these case characteristics 
(conditions). Case characteristics are not “variables” in the usual sense, but degrees of membership of 
a defined category. These conditions may potentially be necessary or sufficient for the outcome to 
happen. With the help of Boolean logic, causal configurations of necessity and sufficiency are 
investigated. A unique aspect of fs/QCA is that it allows the researcher to investigate multi-way 
interaction effects between different conditions, such as different sufficient combinations of conditions 
leading to the same outcome, hence different policy alternatives. All analyses are done with the use of 
fs/QCA 2.0 Software, for it is a standard of good practice for fs/QCA, Schneider and Wagemann 
(2010). Limits of fs/QCA are its mean-average temporality and the rather absolute application of logic. 
However, it is being applied in public policy analysis37: 143 applications between 1992 and 2011 are 
                                                     
35 Formal inclusion of line ministries, not significant, only at 13%, directs our attention to complementary informal 
coordination model, Model No 2. 
36 See additional reports in appendix for Measures of fit, ordered logit Percentage change in odds, Odd Ratios, Marginal 
effects of each independent variable. 
37 fs/QCA has been applied by Pustovrh and Jaklic (2014) to investigate the causal patterns behind the innovation summary 
index success for 23 European countries. In their analysis, the effectiveness of research and innovation governance is 
investigated indirectly, through an investigation of innovation success which is related to 6 conditions: i) human resources 
index, ii) open, excellent and attractive research systems, iii) finance and support, iv) firm investments, v) linkages and 
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reviewed by Rihoux et. al (2011).The five operative steps of fs/QCA are 1) Calibration; 2) Analysis of 
necessary conditions; 3) Truth table minimisation; 4) Analysis of sufficient configurations; and 5) 
Assessment of the quality of results. 
i. Calibration: Calibration means transforming original values into fuzzy membership equivalents for 
each condition using threshold values as parameters of calibration. We used parameters of calibration 
(fully in: 9, crossover: 5, fully out: 2) based on the original SGI questionnaire and codebook38. 
Table 4 – Calibration: the Outcome, Five Conditions, Fuzzy Values 
The Model DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE/ 
OUTCOME 
INFLUENCE 
VARIABLE 1 
INFLUENCE 
VARIABLE 2 
INFLUENCE 
VARIABLE 3 
INFLUENCE 
VARIABLE 4 
INFLUENCE  
VARIABLE 5 
No Member 
States 
R&I POLICY 
EFFECTIVENESS 
OUTCOME 
RIA TOOLS 
WITH 
SUSTAINABILITY 
CHECKS
PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEES 
RESOURCES 
MEDIA 
COVERAGE of RI 
POLICY AND 
POLITICS
SOCIETAL 
CONSULTATION 
COMPLEMENTARY 
INFORMAL 
INTERMINISTERIAL 
COORDINATION
1 Austria 0,5 0,9 0,68 0,28 0,9 0,68 
2 Belgium 
0,68 0,02 0,95 0,99 0,82 0,95 
3 Bulgaria 0,12 0,12 0,27 0,04 0,5 0,5 
4 Croatia 0,12 0,27 0,68 0,03 0,27 0,27 
5 Cyprus 0,27 0,12 0,12 0,56 0,5 0,27 
6 Czech Rep. 0,5 0,68 0,95 0,56 0,5 0,82 
7 Denmark 0,82 0,95 0,9 0,78 0,95 0,9 
8 Estonia 0,82 0,5 0,9 0,45 0,9 0,82 
9 Finland 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,51 0,98 0,98 
10 France 0,82 0,12 0,82 1 0,68 0,9 
11 Germany 0,9 0,9 0,95 1 0,82 0,68 
12 Greece 0,12 0,02 0,68 0,93 0,05 0,68 
13 Hungary 0,27 0,05 0,5 0,06 0,05 0,98 
14 Ireland 0,5 0,27 0,5 0,73 0,27 0,9 
15 Italy 0,27 0,27 0,9 0,87 0,27 0,9 
16 Latvia 0,12 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,82 0,82 
17 Lithuania 0,82 0,68 0,95 0,5 0,82 0,82 
18 Luxembourg 0,68 0,12 0,9 0,05 0,9 0,98 
19 Malta 0,27 0,12 0,12 0,02 0,5 0,27 
20 Netherlands 0,9 0,82 0,68 0,63 0,95 0,82 
21 Poland 0,68 0,82 0,95 0,32 0,82 0,82 
22 Portugal 0,27 0,12 0,68 0,51 0,27 0,27 
23 Romania 0,12 0,12 0,68 0,02 0,12 0,12 
24 Slovakia 0,27 0,12 0,68 0,02 0,82 0,82 
25 Slovenia 0,27 0,05 0,95 0,04 0,27 0,82 
26 Spain 0,12 0,12 0,5 0,85 0,5 0,82 
27 Sweden 0,95 0,82 0,95 0,59 0,9 0,9 
28 UK 0,9 0,98 0,68 1 0,5 0,95 
All data measures represent assessments covering the period of 2011-2013, calibration (fully in: 9, crossover: 5, fully out: 2) based on the 
original questionnaire and codebook, Source: http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2014/basics/SGI2014_Codebook.pdf, the number of news 
items are calibrated as fully in: 108 (twice a week), crossover: 24 (twice a month), full out: 8 (twice a season). 
ii. Analysis of the necessary conditions: A causal condition is called necessary if the instances of the 
outcome constitute a subset of the instances of the causal condition (Ragin, 2006). For a condition to 
be necessary, its membership score on the outcome (coverage) has to be consistently lower than the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
entrepreneurship, and vi) intellectual assets. Their study is not so much a study of the governance but of innovation enablers 
and innovation activities of firms.   
38 Source: http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2014/basics/SGI2014_Codebook.pdf 
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membership score (consistency) of the causal factor. When testing conditions for assessing necessity, 
the threshold for consistency should be high (> .9) and its coverage should not be too low (> .5) 
(Ragin, 2006).  
Table 5 – Analysis of Necessary Conditions – Presence of the outcome 
OUTCOME R&I Policy Effectiveness  
Conditions tested: 
 
Consistency Coverage 
RIA TOOLS 
WITH SUSTAINABILITY 
CHECKS             
 
0.712758 0.902527 
PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEES 
RESOURCES          
 
0.942267 0.677254 
COMPLEMENTARY INFORMAL 
INTERMINISTERIAL 
COORDINATION 
 
0.975053 0.668622 
MEDIA COVERAGE of RI POLICY 
AND POLITICS      
 
0.694227 0.727408 
SOCIETAL CONSULTATION 0.915182 0.771171 
 
Parliamentary committees’ resources, societal consultation, complementary informal inter-ministerial 
coordination are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an effective R&I policy outcome, their 
single presence does not suffice in leading to the positive outcome.  
Table 6 – Analysis of Necessary Conditions – Absence of the outcome 
ABSENCE OF THE OUTCOME R&I Policy Effectiveness  
Conditions tested: 
ABSENSE OF … 
 
Consistency Coverage 
MEDIA COVERAGE of RI POLICY 
AND POLITICS      
 
0.738726 0.706365 
SOCIETAL CONSULTATION 
 
0.727273 0.895154 
PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEES 
RESOURCES          
 
0.549034 0.904481 
RIA TOOLS 
WITH SUSTAINABILITY 
CHECKS             
 
0.922691 0.761820 
COMPLEMENTARY INFORMAL 
INTERMINISTERIAL 
COORDINATION 
0.514674 0.953581 
 
Absence of “regulatory impact assessment with sustainability checks” is a necessary condition for 
ineffective R&I policy. 
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iii. Analysis of sufficiency, Truth tables:  In this step, in order to examine sufficient combinations of 
conditions leading to presence or absence of the outcome, the truth table minimisation algorithm39 is 
applied and intermediate solution is shown which is recommended by Ragin (2008a, 2008b). Using 
0.90 as the cut-off point for sufficiency, the algorithm leads to combinations of causal conditions and 
outcome shown in Table 7 (presence of the outcome) and Table 8 (absence of the outcome) where we 
can see the differences in causal asymmetries.  
iv. Results  
The solutions show that Parliamentary committee’ resources (PACR), societal consultation (SPEC), 
informal inter-ministerial coordination (CIIC) is the core pattern which could either be complemented 
with RIA with sustainability checks (RIASC) or media attention (MCRIPP) in leading to effective 
R&I Policy. Approximately %75 of the cases is explained. Explained cases are mainly of Northern 
and Western Europe.  
 
Table 7 – Sufficient combinations of conditions for effective R&I Policy 
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION40 Raw  
Coverage41    
Unique 
Coverage42 
Consistency 43  
MCRIPP AND SPEC AND CIIC AND PACR + 0.607270 0.099786 0.942478 
SPEC AND CIIC AND PACR  AND RIASC 
 
0.658589   0.151105 0.943820 
Solution coverage:  
(joint importance of all causal paths) 
0.758375 
Solution consistency:  0.908625 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in pressure 
combinations term (1) 
Belgium (0.82,0.68),   Denmark (0.78,0.82), France 
(0.68,0.82), Germany (0.68,0.9),   NLD (0.63,0.9), 
Sweden (0.59,0.95), Finland (0.51,0.95)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in pressure 
combinations term (2) 
Finland (0.95,0.95),    Denmark (0.9,0.82), Poland 
(0.82,0.68), Sweden (0.82,0.95),    Austria (0.68,0.5), 
Germany (0.68,0.9), Lithuania (0.68,0.82),    NLD 
(0.68,0.9) 
“*”:AND, presence of both conditions, +: presence of either condition or of both conditions, overall consistency cut-off: 
0.897822, calculation with fsQCA 2.0 software (www.fsqca.com) 
 
                                                     
39 Truth table solution is a list of different combinations of causal factors that have met specified criteria of sufficiency for the 
outcome to occur. This entails that the membership score on the outcome is consistently higher than the membership score of 
the causal combination. A value of 1 indicates a fuzzy set membership score of 0.5 or above and 0 a score below 0.5. The 
number column gives you the number of cases that exhibit the configuration listed. Raw Consistency means that the 
membership score on the outcome is consistently higher than the membership score of the causal combination, weighted by 
the relevance of each case. The membership score of a causal combination is the minimum fuzzy score in each of the 
conditions. Consistency scores of less than 0.75 or even 0.8 mean that there is considerable inconsistency. Ideally, scores 
should be above 0.9. Raw consistency is the degree to which x is a consistent subset of y, also called “inclusion.” 
40  In the truth table analysis, if the truth table with the "remainder" rows (combinations lacking good instances) set to "don't 
care” then this is called parsimonious solution (which allows the incorporation of remainders into the solution) It is a 
reduction in complexity requiring the incorporation of simplifying assumptions that entail "difficult" counterfactuals. The 
complex solution (with remainders set to "false"), and the parsimonious solution (with remainders set to "don't care"). 
Intermediate solutions use only a subset of the simplifying assumptions that are used in the most parsimonious solution, 
therefore intermediate solution is preferred over parsimonious solutions 
41 Raw coverage refers to the size of the overlap between the size of the casual combination set and the outcome set relative 
to the outcome set (Ragin, 2006:301) 
42 Unique coverage controls for overlapping explanations by partitioning the raw coverage 
43 Consistency of partial casual path  
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For effective R&I policy outcome, configurational solution patterns are:  
 
Parliamentary Committee’ Resources AND Societal Consultation AND Informal Inter-
ministerial coordination AND 
(RIASC OR MCRIPP) 
(Consistency: 0.91, Coverage 0.76, 10 Strong Cases) 
 
For the absence of effective R&I policy, the solution below shows that absence of RIA with 
sustainability checks (RIASC) is common in both configurations. Absence of societal consultation 
(SPEC) leads to ineffective outcome even if it is coupled with presence of Parliamentary committee’ 
resources (PACR). Interesting is the case of Latvia where presence of societal consultation (SPEC) 
and informal inter-ministerial coordination (CIIC) are not enough to bring about effective R&I policy 
when coupled with the lack of RIA with sustainability checks (RIASC), media attention (MCRIPP) 
and Parliamentary committee’ resources (PACR). Approximately %68 of the cases is explained. 
Explained cases are mainly of Southern Europe.  
 
Table 8 – Sufficient combinations of conditions for ineffective R&I Policy  
 
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION Raw  
Coverage44    
Unique 
Coverage45 
Consistency46 
ABSENCE OF SPEC AND ABSENCE OF RIASC
AND PRESENCE OF PACR   
 
0.576235 0.382963 0.976942 
PRESENCE OF SPEC AND PRESENCE OF CIIC 
AND ABSSENCE OF MCRIPP AND ABSENCE OF 
PACR AND ABSSENCE OF RIASC 
 
0.302076 0.108805 0.981395 
Solution coverage:  
(joint importance of all causal paths) 
0.685039 
Solution consistency:  0.972561 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in pressure 
combinations (term 1) 
Italy (0.73,0.73),    Slovenia (0.73,0.73), Croatia (0.68,0.88), 
Greece (0.68,0.88),   Portugal (0.68,0.73), Romania 
(0.68,0.88) 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in pressure 
combinations (term 2) 
Latvia (0.82,0.88) 
 “*”:AND, presence of both conditions, +: presence of either condition or of both conditions, overall consistency cutoff: 
0.897822, calculation with fsQCA 2.0 software (www.fsqca.com) 
 
 
 
Absence of Regulatory Impact Assessment with Sustainability Checks AND  
 (ABSENCE OF SPEC AND PRESENCE OF PACR  
OR 
PRESENCE OF SPEC AND PRESENCE OF CIIC AND ABSENCE OF PACR AND ABSSENCE OF MCRIPP) 
(Consistency: 0.97, Coverage: 0.68, 7 Strong Cases) 
 
 
 
                                                     
44 Raw coverage refers to the size of the overlap between the size of the casual combination set and the outcome set relative 
to the outcome set (Ragin, 2006:301) 
45 Unique coverage controls for overlapping explanations by partitioning the raw coverage 
46 Consistency of partial casual path/solution term   
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v. Assessment of the robustness and quality of the results 
 
The explanatory capacity of fs/QCA models requires verification with visualisation on X-Y plots 
(Schneider and Grofman, 2006).  If y < 0.5 (outcome) and x > 0.5 (solution), this situation signals a 
contradiction that falsifies the entire model (Zone 3 – right bottom square- of Figure 1 and 2 below). 
These are called deviant cases, consistency in kind, which are not observed in any of our solutions. 
 
Figure 1– Solution Plot – Presence of the Outcome 
 
 
Although, we do have irrelevant cases (Zone 4) and deviant cases, these are of consistency in degree 
(consistency outliers) (Zone 2) and this situation does not invalidate either the model or the solutions, 
on the contrary calls for more sophisticated qualitative analysis such as process tracing. Despite these 
outliers, our approach proves being able to generate reliable configurational recipes for R&I policy 
effectiveness, especially for explaining the absence or low values of R&I policy effectiveness, with 
similar consistency, coverage scores and outlier conditions in Damonte (2014) which assess 
environmental performance in EU-15 by fs/QCA. 
Figure 2– Solution Plot – Absence of the Outcome 
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4. Discussion of the results 
In this section we state and discuss the main findings. In the ordered logit analysis of the (separate) 
influence of our five explanatory variables of proximate governance, societal consultation is revealed 
to have the greatest effect on effective R&I innovation policy (our dependent variable), followed by 
parliamentary committees’ resources, complementary informal inter-ministerial coordination, 
regulatory impact assessment with sustainability checks, and media attention. The order of importance 
is quite interesting, by questioning the actual power of executive ministerial personnel which appears 
to be conditioned by the political (political, legislative actors decisions), and by questioning the power 
of political actors which appears to be conditioned by societal demands (which is dispersed at societal 
level, of different social, economic, and environmental groups). The contribution of regulatory impact 
assessment with sustainability checks is relatively small (of the influence variables it has the smallest 
significant influence).  
Interaction effects of proximate political governance conditions are studied with the help of 
configurational set-theoretic analysis for complementary informal coordination variant. Although each 
variable are statistically significant, multi-way interactions may be required to be able to bring about 
effective R&I policy. Parliamentary committee’ resources (PACR), societal consultation (SPEC), 
informal inter-ministerial coordination (CIIC) form the core pattern which could either be 
complemented with RIA with sustainability checks (RIASC) or media attention (MCRIPP) in leading 
to effective R&I Policy, observed mainly in Northern and Western European Member States (e.g. 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland). This situation reveals as an 
interesting finding that impact of Media Attention and Regulatory Impact Assessment with 
Sustainability Checks is set-theoretically substitutable, functionally equivalent, meaning that they are 
connected to the solution configuration with a logical OR. This finding can be interpreted as saying 
that governments are more likely to formulate effective R&I policy either under presence of high 
Media Attention (publicity, electorate pressures) or with rigorous use of RIA with sustainability checks 
(recognition of presence of economic, social and environmental pressures), therefore default electorate 
pressures and recognition of societal pressures functionally converge. Set-theoretic analysis is also 
used to investigate the conditions for ineffective R&I policies. It is found that a low values or absence 
of Regulatory Impact Assessment with Sustainability Checks is the common trait between the cases 
which are mainly Southern European Member States (e.g. Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Portugal, 
and Romania). The main pattern leading to ineffective R&I policy is also due to lack of societal 
consultation openness from the government side even if political opposition is present. This situation, 
being in line with the results of econometric analyses, provides insights for the need of further 
openness, democratisation in socio-technical and socio-political systems in these countries.  
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Both types of analyses of effective R&I innovation policy are based on a model of proximate 
governance. In an attempt to investigate the influence of distal variables such as property rights and 
culture, we did the following analyses: For six World Governance Indicators representing distal 
variables (Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Regulatory 
Quality, Voice and Accountability, and Government Effectiveness) we investigated the correlations 
with proximate variables and indices of proximate governance. Of the variables, Control of Corruption 
and Regulatory Quality are the ones that are most strongly correlated with proximate governance. The 
influence of Regulatory Quality is as expected. The strong correlation of Control of Corruption is 
striking, but in the absence of further evidence of a causal link we don’t want to draw conclusions on 
this. When investigating the correlation between distal variables and the proximate variables, we 
learned that Societal Consultation is the most highly correlated variable among the set of proximate 
political governance determinants with the distal variables provided by Democracy Barometer and 
World Governance Indicators of the World Bank (See Appendix Table A2 Column 9). This suggests 
that the influence of distal variables is through Societal Consultation or works in combination with the 
degree of Societal Consultation. Whether the correlation is causal cannot be determined with certainty, 
but we think it is worthwhile to mention the strong correlation with Societal Consultation.   
 
5. Concluding remarks and avenues of future research 
We analysed the influence of five variables of proximate political governance on the effectiveness of 
R&I policy: Media publicity of governmental decisions in the field of R&I, regulatory impact 
assessment extended to sustainability checks, resources of parliamentary committees, complementary 
informal inter-ministerial coordination between layers of government, and openness of governments to 
societal actor groups through societal consultation. Our findings offer pointers for R&I policy design, 
such as including a process-oriented societal consultation, enhancing parliamentary committee 
resources for R&I policy surveillance, triggering media’s R&I policy attention as an integral part to 
R&I policy design at national level. Our results may be used to evaluate existing governance structures 
and help policy makers determine ways to improve the governance system for effective research and 
innovation policy (something which cannot be determined on the basis of our analysis alone).  
Further research could concentrate on comparative case studies of specific Member States, innovation 
programmes or public projects, and especially their stories of success and failure with respect to 
evaluating media/public attention, parliamentary committee debates about them, the degrees to which 
the varieties  (formal, informal, communicative) of administrative coordination performed at decision-
making level, and whether sophisticated RIAs are used before or after designing these programmes or 
public projects. Another important topic for future research is the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
design and implementation and in bringing about effective R&I policy. In the absence of national 
comparative data, we could not analyse the role of policy entrepreneurs statistically.  
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At the EU-level, further research could be conducted on pan-European societal consultation47 and 
policy entrepreneurship networks, European-level initiatives in enhancing European R&I-related 
coverage in the national media48, European smart regulation agenda49 (tools such as impact 
assessment, the standard cost model, and ex-post evaluation of regulatory regimes at national level 
which generates capacity for further coordination across policy problems at international level, 
European services in providing information resources50 for the use of national-level parliamentary 
committees, and the Europeanisation of the mind-set of ministerial personnel at the national level51. 
Research about such further specialised job creation possibilities in media, in parliamentary 
committees’ support services in relation to the field of R&I could also be a stimulating extension for 
R&I policy that could create jobs external to the socio-technical system, in the co-evolving socio-
political system.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1 – The PPG Model and Data 
The Model 
& 
Data 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE/ 
OUTCOME 
INF. 
VAR1 
INF. 
VAR2 INF. VAR3  INF. VAR4 Inter-ministerial Coordination 
     INF. 
VAR5.
1 
Formal 
INF. 
VAR5.2 
Informal 
INF.  
VAR 
5.3 
Communica-
tive 
No Member States RIPE 
OUTCOME 
RIASC PARC MCRIPP SPEC ISLM CIIC VHPC 
1 Austria 5 8 6 19 8 3 6 5 
2 Belgium 6 1 9 146 7 10 9 5 
3 Bulgaria 3 3 4 7 5 6 5 4 
4 Croatia 3 4 6 6 4 4 4 4 
5 Cyprus 4 3 3 30 5 3 4 2 
6 Czech Rep. 5 6 9 30 5 6 7 4 
7 Denmark 7 9 8 58 9 9 8 8 
8 Estonia 7 5 8 23 8 8 7 5 
9 Finland 9 9 9 25 10 9 10 9 
10 France 7 3 7 177 6 9 8 7 
11 Germany 8 8 9 296 7 7 6 6 
12 Greece 3 1 6 94 2 7 6 2 
13 Hungary 4 2 5 9 2 10 10 10 
14 Ireland 5 4 5 51 4 9 8 8 
15 Italy 4 4 8 74 4 8 8 5 
16 Latvia 3 2 2 8 7 8 7 8 
17 Lithuania 7 6 9 24 7 7 7 6 
18 Luxembourg 6 3 8 8 8 8 10 8 
19 Malta 4 3 3 2 5 3 4 4 
20 Netherlands 8 7 6 38 9 8 7 9 
21 Poland 6 7 9 20 7 8 7 7 
22 Portugal 4 3 6 25 4 7 4 7 
23 Romania 3 3 6 4 3 5 3 4 
24 Slovakia 4 3 6 3 7 4 7 6 
25 Slovenia 4 2 9 7 4 3 7 4 
26 Spain 3 3 5 71 5 7 7 6 
27 Sweden 9 7 9 34 8 7 8 9 
28 UK 8 10 6 607 5 9 9 8 
Data Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/ and Lexis Nexis Academic http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/ 
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Table A2 – Correlation Table 
 
 
*All 5% level correlations are tested with respect to collinearity diagnosis in Table A7. No individual VIF value is above 10 or tolerance below 0.1.- No condition number above 15 or 30 for the selected system of 
variables. SGI (2011-2013) ISLM:  Inclusion of Sectorial Line Ministries; CIIC: Complementary Informal Inter-ministerial Coordination ; VHPC: Policy Communication ; RIASC: RIA with Sustainability Checks; 
PACR :  Parliamentary Committees’ Resources; MA: Media Attention to governmental decisions (generic); SPEC: Societal Consultation , Lexis Nexis (2011-2013) MCRIPP Media Attention/Coverage of R&I Policy 
and Politics, Democracy Barometer (2011), PRIGHT: Property rights , PETITIO: Signed Petitions , DEMO: Attended demonstrations,  World Bank (2011)  ROL: Rule of Law , COC: Control of Corruption PSAV: 
Political stability and Absence of Violence REGQ: Regulatory Quality VAA: Voice and Accountability, GOE: Government Effectiveness
TYPE 
VAR  ISLM  CIIC  VHPC  RIASC  PACR  MA  MRI  LMRI  SPEC  PRIGHT  PETITIO  DEMO  ROL  COC  PSAV  REGQ  VAA  GOE 
Proximate 
ISLM  1 
CIIC  0.7966*  1 
VHPC  0.6967*  0.6913*  1 
RIASC  0.1205  0.1544  0.3558  1 
PACR  0.1891  0.3652  0.1105  0.3846*  1 
MA  0.1835  0.3685  0.3107  0.5439*  0.2861  1 
MCRIPP  0.5337*  0.3839*  0.2205  0.2707  0.2708  0.2503  1 
Log MCRIPP   0.5337*  0.3839*  0.2205  0.2707  0.2708  0.2503  1.0000*  1 
Boundary 
SPEC  0.2154  0.3295  0.4493*  0.5461*  0.3833*  0.6159*  0.0871  0.0871  1 
Distal  
PRIGHT  0.366  0.4442*  0.5408*  0.5249*  0.2422  0.6868*  0.4664*  0.4664*  0.6063*  1 
PETITIO  0.3512  0.5121*  0.4145*  0.4984*  0.3142  0.4494*  0.5392*  0.5392*  0.4555*  0.6448*  1 
DEMO  0.0775  0.0437  0.0172  ‐0.1213  ‐0.1752  0.202  0.4236*  0.4236*  0.0217  0.2925  0.4833*  1 
ROL  0.1813  0.2507  0.1518  0.4868*  0.4061*  0.2707  0.4458*  0.4458*  0.4230*  0.5097*  0.4859*  0.0246  1 
COC  0.4419*  0.5355*  0.6206*  0.4840*  0.3542  0.6140*  0.4685*  0.4685*  0.6301*  0.9444*  0.7178*  0.2839  0.5281*  1 
PSAV  0.0056  0.2763  0.3626  0.4700*  0.4493*  0.3924*  ‐0.1057  ‐0.1057  0.5710*  0.5623*  0.4107*  ‐0.1819  0.4122*  0.5712*  1 
REGQ  0.3778*  0.5339*  0.5714*  0.5638*  0.2093  0.7526*  0.3302  0.3302  0.6978*  0.9126*  0.6798*  0.2554  0.4942*  0.8716*  0.5829*  1 
VAA  0.4605*  0.5890*  0.6580*  0.3983*  0.2629  0.5741*  0.3604  0.3604  0.5591*  0.9195*  0.6297*  0.2278  0.4945*  0.9229*  0.6284*  0.8696*  1 
GOE  0.2781  0.4356*  0.4653*  0.4384*  0.2564  0.6692*  0.373  0.373  0.6979*  0.9328*  0.6851*  0.2923  0.5202*  0.9396*  0.6163*  0.8987*  0.8749*  1 
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STATA Outputs  
Table A3- Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable  
 
ORDINAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Partly/ 
Negative 
Partly/ 
Stable 
Partly/ 
Positive 
Largely/
Negative 
Largely/
Stable 
Largely/
Positive 
Effective/ 
Stable 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Table A4- Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality:  
 
For each variable sktest presents a test for normality based on skewness and another based on kurtosis 
and then combines the two tests into an overall test statistic. Media attention seems skewed but log of 
media attention is not. Using log transformed variable, we obtained similar results.  
Table A5- Correlations (Spearman for ordinal variables) 
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Table A6- Collinearity Diagnostics for system of variables 
 
No individual VIF value is above 10 or tolerance below 0.1 - No condition number above 15 or 30.  
Diagnostics also applies to VHPC and ISLM. 
Table A7- Measures of fit (ordered logit) 
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Table A8.a– Odds Ratios 
 
The interpretation would be that for a one unit change in the predictor variable, the odds for cases in a 
group that is greater than k versus less than or equal to k are the proportional odds times larger.  
Table A8.b– Odds Ratios (log Media) 
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Table A9.a- Marginal effects of each independent variable 
 
Table A9.b- Marginal effects of each independent variable (log Media) 
 
Obtaining marginal effects of each independent variable, holding the others constant at their mean 
reveals that marginal effect of openness of government to external policy entrepreneurs is greater than 
other influence variables  
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Table A12 - Media Coverage in Research & Innovation Policy and Politics / Lexis Nexis 1 May 
2011- 15 May 2013 
 
Source: http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/ 
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APPENDIX - Supplementary File – Component A / Showcases for Theoretically-informed 
Selected Variables 
Box SF1.1 – Cases of Inclusion of Sectorial Line Ministries (ISLM) 
Case – Excerpt: “Denmark, The Netherlands, Hungary” 
Source: SGI, 2011-2013 
http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Governance/Executive_Capacity/Interministerial_Coordination/Line_Ministries 
 
Denmark: “Major issues and strategic considerations are dealt with in the government coordination committee 
(regeringens koordineringsudvalg) involving the prime minister and other key ministers. 
The Ministry of Finance also plays an important role whenever financial resources are involved. No minister can go to 
the finance committee of the People’s Assembly (Folketing) without prior agreement from the Ministry of Finance. Apart 
from coordinating the preparation of next year’s finances, the Ministry of Finance is also involved in formulating general 
economic policy and offering economic and administrative assessments of the consequences of proposed laws.52” (SGI, 
2014) 
 
The Netherlands: “Generally, the initiative by a line ministry to start drafting new legislation or a white paper is rooted in 
the government policy accord, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting 
to one or two line ministries. With complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable jockeying for position 
among the various line ministries.53’’ (SGI, 2014) 
 
Hungary: “To ease central control, the number of line ministries has been limited to seven, with portfolios for foreign 
affairs, defense, interior, national economy, national development, human (earlier national) resources (EMMI) and 
rural development (VM). The small number of ministries has complicated their representation on the various EU councils, 
and created additional confusion with regard to coordination efforts during the Hungarian EU presidency in 2011. ”. 
(SGI, 2014) 
Box SF1.2 – Case of Complementary Informal Inter-ministerial Coordination (CIIC) 
Case – Excerpt: “Finland, The Netherlands, Hungary” 
Source: SGI, 2011-2013 
http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Governance/Executive_Capacity/Interministerial_Coordination/Informal_Coordination 
 
Finland: “Inter-sectoral coordination has generally been perceived as an important issue, but rather few institutional 
mechanisms have in fact been introduced. One of these is the so-called iltakoulu, or evening session, which is an unofficial 
negotiation session of the Cabinet. To a considerable extent, though, coordination proceeds effectively through informal 
mechanisms. The recent large-scale policy programs enhance inter-sectoral divisions in policymaking and administration. 
Additionally, Finnish EU membership has of course brought forth the need for increased inter-ministerial coordination. 
Recent research in Finland has only marginally focused on informal mechanisms.” (SGI, 2014) 
 
The Netherlands: “Under the present conditions in which civil servants are subject to increasing parliamentary and 
media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are 
growing, informal coordination as well as personal chemistry among civil servants is what keeps things running. 
Regarding inter-ministerial coordination, informal contacts between the senior staff (raadsadviseurs) in the prime 
ministers Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, 
such bureaucratic coordination is undermined by insufficient or absent informal political coordination”54.  
 
Hungary: “The strong formal role of Prime Minister and his Chancellery has been complemented by informal 
coordination mechanisms. There are about 150 top decision-makers within the Hungarian government that are appointed 
directly by the prime minister. Within this group there are two circles of informality and confidence. First, Prime Minister 
meets his closest 20 to 30 people regularly, and many important decisions stem from these personal encounters. Second, 
Prime Minister from time to time convenes some officials from the larger circle to whom he gives instructions. Many 
decisions originate from these meetings, and such decisions are processed through the system informally before any 
formal decision is taken. These informal coordination mechanisms make rapid decisions possible. Given the pivotal role of 
the prime minister, however, such a process also creates a bottleneck in decision-making”. (SGI, 2014) 
                                                     
52 Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen et al., Politik og forvaltning, 2007 
53 R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2009), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
54 R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2009), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 169, 181-183, 204. 
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Box SF1.3 – Case of Vertical and Horizontal Policy Communication (VHPC) 
Case – Excerpt: “Hungary, The Netherlands, Lithuania” 
Source: SGI, 2011-2013 
http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Governance/Executive_Capacity/Policy_Communication/Coherent_Communication 
 
 
Hungary: “The Prime Minister’s Chancellery largely coordinates and controls government communication. Ministers 
tend to follow the prime minister’s message; and for this reason, the Chancellery has often been derided as a “chorus of 
parrots.” Contradictory statements by individual ministers are rare. If they do occur, the statements are corrected quickly 
by the prime minister and his staff or aides. In December 2012, for instance, an improvised statement by Prime Minister 
Orbán in Brussels ended a period of confusion over the government’s position on university enrollment.” (SGI, 2014) 
 
The Netherlands: “The 1Logo project, for example, aims to impose a single brand and editorial policy on all websites run 
by the national government. Another project aims to create a single pool of government communication and information 
officials to be used by all departments. The project also includes establishing a shared intranet (rijksportaal.nl) and joint 
digital news service for all officials working for the national government. Another effort toward centralized, coherent 
communication involves replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns with a unified, thematic 
approach (e.g., safety). All these efforts to have government speak with “one mouth” appear to have been fairly 
successful.” (SGI, 2014) 
 
Lithuania: “Although the Butkevičius government announced that it would pursue a whole-of-government approach to 
public policy and management, the implications of this goal in terms of coherent communications had not been addressed 
at the time of writing. Moreover, Prime Minister Butkevičius has himself publicly made contradictory statements on such 
politically important issues as tax reform or the future of nuclear power in Lithuania, probably reflecting the diversity of 
opinions within his party and the ruling coalition.” (SGI, 2014) 
 
 
Box SF2 – Case of Media Attention 
Case – Excerpt: “George Osborne pledges extra £600m for science to stimulate growth”, 
Source: Ian Sample, December 5, 2012 Wednesday, The Guardian 
 
“George Osborne55 will divert £600m from savings across Whitehall into science research facilities and advanced 
technology projects chosen for their potential to drive financial growth….The funds amount to the single largest addition to 
UK research spending since the coalition came to power, and underpin the government's conviction that science and 
technology are key to the nation's economic recovery. The science minister, David Willetts, said “science and innovation 
were "fundamental" to the UK economy and that the extra money would support areas where Britain can gain a competitive 
advantage “This will drive growth, create the jobs of the future, and help us get ahead in the global race,"  Imran Khan, 
director of the Campaign for Science and Engineering, said he was "delighted" with the government's support to make the 
UK a high-tech nation.  Paul Nurse, president of the Royal Society said “The announcement today of an additional £600m 
of capital investment will hopefully help ensure that our world leading scientists have world leading facilities with which to 
work." Nurse warned that while the chancellor had identified eight areas where the UK already has an edge, other fields of 
science must not be neglected. "We must not narrow our focus too much and risk sacrificing the ideas that will create 
growth decades from now," Nurse said. The science community applauded the announcement, though some pointed out 
that Britain still faced strong competition from countries that invest more in science. 
 
Box SF3 – Case of RIA with Sustainability Checks 
Case – Excerpt: “Sustainability in Impact Assessments”, 
Source: OECD, 2012 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Sustainability%20in%20impact%20assessment%20SG-SD%282011%296-
FINAL.pdf 
 
“The consideration of sustainability issues in IA adds the perspective of intergenerational justice, international fairness and 
the consideration of trade-offs between social, environmental and economic aspects to the intention of designing better, 
more effective and efficient regulations and policies. IA has the potential to enhance the consideration of concerns of SD in 
                                                     
55 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury since 2010 and the Member of Parliament for Tatton 
since 2001, Source:  OSBORNE, Rt Hon. George (Gideon Oliver). Who's Who 2015 (online Oxford University Press)    
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decision making, but it faces considerable challenges and difficulties as well. Integrating the long term perspective and a 
holistic approach covering many different impact areas to IA add considerably to the difficulties which are already inherent 
in evidence based policy making. However, concerns of better regulation as well as of SD are cross cutting issues of 
government which can mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete, because of common concerns they share. Main 
common concerns include:  
• increased interdepartmental and interdisciplinary work;  
• improving transparency and consultation;  
• the coherence of policies with the priorities of governments; and  
• the full consideration of long-term costs and benefits in decision-making.” 
 
Box SF4– Case of Parliamentary Committees 
Case – Excerpt: “2nd Parliamentary Debate in Lisbon”, 
Source: Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology Assessment (PACITA) 
http://pacita.strast.cz/en/events/2nd-parliamentary-debate-in-lisbon 
 
 
“Policy-makers attending the meeting will be elected members of Parliaments, members of ministries, scientific advisors, 
lobbyists, etc. During the first Parliamentary Meeting held in June 2012 in Copenhagen, the policy-makers shared with the 
Technology Assessment community their expectations and concerns related to the mission of Technology Assessment… On 
April 8, 2014, the PACITA partners will organise a 2nd Parliamentary debate in Lisbon, where the project partners and 
other interested institutions from various spheres will participate together with parliamentarians from the PACITA partners´ 
countries in order to discuss current issues regarding technology assessment in Europe. Participants will discuss these 
questions on the basis of concrete projects and initiatives, as well as on their daily life of politicians and policy-makers. The 
second Parliamentary TA Debate should provide an opportunity for policy-makers from all over Europe to meet and share 
their experiences with respect to policy-making on science, technology and innovation.” Organiser name: Danielle Buetschi 
 
Box SF5 – Case of Societal Consultation (SPEC) 
Case – Excerpt: “Denmark, The Netherlands, Latvia” 
Source: SGI, 2011-2013 
http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Governance/Executive_Capacity/Societal_Consultation/Negotiating_Public_Support 
 
Denmark: There is a long tradition of involving economic and social actors at all stages of the policy cycle, even 
sometimes in the implementation phase. Both formally and informally, there are good contacts between the government 
administration and the main interest organizations (e.g., trade unions, employers, various business organizations and 
NGOs), as well as heads of major companies. Interest organizations provide important information for politicians and civil 
servants. While corporatism has changed over the years, it still exists in Denmark56.  
 
The Netherlands: International references to the “polder model” as form of consensus-building testifies to the Dutch 
reputation for negotiating public support for public policies, sometimes as a precondition for parliamentary approval. the 
government consults extensively with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society during policy 
preparation and attempts to involve them in policy implementation. It has been a strong factor in the mode of political 
operation and public policymaking deployed by the Rutte I (2010 - 2012) and Rutte II (2012 - present) governments.57  
 
Latvia:  Consultations are perceived as formal, and in fact offer little opportunity to make an impact on the direction and 
quality of government policies. NGOs have voiced complaints about the quality of participation, prompting the Council of 
Ministers/NGO cooperation council to conduct a cross-ministry review of consultation practices during 2011 and 2012.In 
its public consultations, the government is rarely successful in achieving an exchange of views and information that 
increases the quality of government policies or induces societal actors to support them58 (SGI, 2014) 
 
 
                                                     
56 Henning Jorgensen, Consensus, Cooperation and Conflict: The Policy Making Process in Denmark, 2002. 
57 R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2009), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p. 169-179, 208-228. 
58 State Chancellery (2011, 2012), Reports, Available at (in Latvian): http://www.mk.gov.lv/vk/gadaparskats/, Last assessed: 
20.05.2013 
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Supplementary File – Component B – Quantitative Discussions of interaction between distal 
variables and proximate political governance, and the selection of Societal Consultation variable  
We constructed three proximate political governance indices with principal components analysis and 
equal weighting (Table SF2 a, b, c) considering statistically significant coefficients of each constituent 
in regression analysis (Table SF1) and checked for the correlations between these three indices and 
those institutional (distal) variables, namely the World Governance Indicators of World Bank (Table 
SF3). This correlation analysis revealed significant positive correlations (Table SF3). As expected our 
four-variable proximate political governance indices are relatively less correlated with “Rule of Law” 
and “Political stability and absence of violence” indicators of the World Bank due to their constituents. 
Therefore, we extended our analysis to find proxies for these broader variables in relation to R&I 
policy. “Rule of Law” indicator of the World Bank is easier to associate with R&I policy -we used 
Property Rights (for Rule of Law) Indicator as a proxy from Democracy Barometer, measuring 
effective guarantee of property rights in a regime. Finding proxies relating to R&I under “Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence” is not that straightforward. From Democracy Barometer, we used 
“signed petitions” relating to R&I policy for it captures a form of non-institutionalised participation  
and “attended demonstrations” for it captures a practice of non-institutionalised participation  that 
could be associated with R&I considering petitions and demonstration relating to R&I in Europe as 
two showcases at this distal, societal level59 . We used “media access of politicians during elections” 
as a measure of the extent to which political candidates and parties have fair access to the media and 
other means of communication, from Bertelsmann Stiftung to capture not restricted or refused access 
to media on grounds of different political opinions, property or other status as defined by Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, considering examples of the media content provided by the Royal Society and The 
Telegraph60 as two examples of R&I-related opinion spectrum of political parties before elections at 
this distal, societal level. Incorporating our proximate political governance indices with these distal 
variables on property rights, signed petitions, attended demonstrations from Democracy Barometer, 
and media access of politicians variable from Bertelsmann Stiftung into regression analyses revealed 
positive statistical significance for all variables, and the sign of the attended demonstrations being 
negative, as expected (Table SF 5). Considering these distal variables, we think we justify inclusion 
our fifth variable: societal consultation of government into our proximate political governance model, 
as a proxy for internalisation capacity of distal conditions into proximate political governance by 
governmental action as boundary work.  
 
                                                     
59 Research protests and activism Source: http://www.euroscientist.com/repeated-research-protests-streets-madrid/ 
http://www.euroscientist.com/southern-european-scientists-become-activists-as-recession-bites/ 
60 Royal Society, Party Manifestos on R&I Source: http://blogs.royalsociety.org/in-verba/2015/04/17/what-do-the-party-
manifestos-say-on-research-and-innovation/ and  Telegraph “When is the election? May 7. Who wants your vote? 
Conservatives, Labour, Lib Dems, Ukip, Green Party and SNP. But do you know their environment policies?” Source: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11461278/Environment-Election-2015-party-policies.html 
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Table SF1– Regression Results: Proximate political governance, three sub-models  
Dependent Variable:  Ordered Logit 
Model 1 
Ordered Logit 
Model 2 
Ordered Logit 
Model 3 
Research and Innovation Policy Effectiveness  Formal 
Coordination 
Informal 
Coordination 
Communicative 
Coordination 
 
Influence Variables: 
Line Ministries Inclusion to Policy Proposals (VH1)  0.349**     
  ‐0.174     
Informal Inter‐ministerial Coordination (VH2)    0.431**   
    ‐0.194   
Policy Communication (VH3)      0.525** 
      ‐0.257 
RIA extended to Sustainability Checks   0.601***  0.611***  0.517** 
  ‐0.155  ‐0.17  ‐0.227 
Parliamentary Committees’ Resources  0.472**  0.422**  0.595** 
  ‐0.221  ‐0.207  ‐0.278 
Media Coverage of Government Decisions  0.882**  0.722**  0.847** 
  ‐0.305  ‐0.329  ‐0.339 
       
cut1  9.139***  8.751***  10.13** 
_cons  ‐2.48  ‐2.202  ‐3.133 
cut2  11.83***  11.56***  13.02*** 
_cons  ‐2.639  ‐2.476  ‐3.403 
cut3  13.17***  12.79***  14.30*** 
_cons  ‐3.002  ‐2.758  ‐3.779 
cut4  14.28***  13.78***  15.39*** 
_cons  ‐3.255  ‐2.894  ‐3.846 
cut5  16.02***  15.38***  17.13*** 
_cons  ‐3.255  ‐2.898  ‐3.825 
cut6  18.04***  17.42***  19.50*** 
_cons  ‐3.354  ‐2.967  ‐4.217 
omodel: Approximate likelihood‐ratio test of 
proportionality of odds across response categories: 
chi2(20) =     
28.30 
Prob > chi2 =    
0.1026 
chi2(20) =     
20.08 
Prob > chi2 =    
0.4529 
chi2(20) =     25.02 
Prob > chi2 =    
0.2007 
Member States  28  28  28 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Results indicate an important positive influence for each of the four variables in three different 
configurations. Therefore we constructed three proximate political governance indices with principal 
components analysis and equal weighting. We checked the correlations between our three indices and 
those institutional (distal) variables, namely the World Governance Indicators, which assigned 
significant correlations. Our indices are, as expected, relatively less correlated with “Rule of Law” and 
“Political stability and absence of violence”. Therefore, we extended our analysis to these broader 
variables in relation to R&I policy.  
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Table SF2.a– Index Formation with PCA and Equal Weights61 
 
. gen PPG4_LM_PCA = 0.3621*LineMinistries +0.5424*SustainabilityCheck + 0.5064*ParliamentaryResources   + 0.5641*Media 
Table SF2.b– Index Formation with PCA and Equal Weights62 
 
. gen PPG4_IC_PCA = 0.4704*InformalCoordination +0.4867*SustainabilityCheck + 0.4868*ParliamentaryResources + 
0.5521*Media 
 
 
                                                     
61 Equal weights are calculated: . gen PPG4_LM_EW = (LineMinistries + SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen 
PPG4_IC_EW = (InformalCoordination +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen PPG4_PC_EW = 
(PolicyCommunication +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 
62 Equal weights are calculated: . gen PPG4_LM_EW = (LineMinistries + SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen 
PPG4_IC_EW = (InformalCoordination +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen PPG4_PC_EW = 
(PolicyCommunication +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 
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Table SF2.c– Index Formation with PCA and Equal Weights63 
 
. gen PPG4_PC_PCA = 0.4333*PolicyCommunication +0.5614*SustainabilityCheck + 0.4321*Parliam entaryResources + 
0.5571*Media 
 
                                                     
63 Equal weights are calculated: . gen PPG4_LM_EW = (LineMinistries + SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen 
PPG4_IC_EW = (InformalCoordination +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 . gen PPG4_PC_EW = 
(PolicyCommunication +SustainabilityCheck + ParliamentaryResources + Media)/4 
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Table SF3 – Correlations of our Indices with WGI indicators 
Indices 
 
PPG4_LM
_PCA 
PPG4_IC_P
CA 
PPG4_PC_P
CA 
PPG4_LM_
EW 
PPG4_IC_
EW 
PPG4_PC_
EW ROL COC PSAV REGQ VAA GOE 
Formal Coordinative PPG 
(pca) 
1                       
Informal Coordinative PPG 
(pca) 
0.9759* 1                     
Communicative PPG (pca) 0.9664* 0.9591* 1                   
Formal Coordinative PPG (ew) 0.9943* 0.9634* 0.9498* 1                 
Informal Coordinative PPG 
(ew) 
0.9754* 0.9998* 0.9577* 0.9640* 1               
Communicative PPG (ew) 0.9662* 0.9607* 0.9979* 0.9542* 0.9601* 1             
WGI 2011                         
Rule of Law 0.5054* 0.5063* 0.4716* 0.4894* 0.5078* 0.4625* 1           
Control of Corruption 0.6407* 0.6558* 0.6952* 0.6338* 0.6516* 0.6950* 0.5034* 1         
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence 
0.5077* 0.5745* 0.6020* 0.4699* 0.5725* 0.6060* 0.3521 0.5928* 1       
Regulatory Quality 0.6730* 0.7000* 0.7380* 0.6594* 0.6943* 0.7265* 0.4760* 
0.8837
* 
0.6000
* 1     
Voice and Accountability 0.6133* 0.6666* 0.6714* 0.6157* 0.6657* 0.6789* 0.5338* 
0.8902
* 
0.6610
* 0.8566* 1   
Government Effectiveness 0.5896* 0.6349* 0.6404* 0.5724* 0.6296* 0.6316* 0.5059* 
0.9379
* 
0.6435
* 0.8804* 0.8865* 1 
For “Rule of Law” we use Property Rights and for Political Stability and Absence of Violence we used “signed petitions”, “attended demonstrations” and “media access of 
politicians during elections” as metric-based factors. 
Table SF4 – Picking the Distal (action-oriented) Variables 
Proximate Line Ministries 
Informal Coordination 
Policy Communication 
Sustainability Checks Parliamentary Committees  Media Attention 
Broader Property Rights      Petitions  Demonstrations64           Electoral Politicians’ Media Access 
World Governance 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Rule of Law Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
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Table SF5 – Regression results with Sub-Models (with different index creation methods, and broader/distal institutional conditions) 
Level  Dependent Variable:  Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model2.1  Model2.2 Model3.1 Model3.2
  Research and Innovation 
Policy Effectiveness 
Formal Coordinative
Model 
(PCA) 
Formal Coordinative 
Model 
(Equal Weights) 
Informal Coordinative 
Model 
(PCA) 
Informal 
Coordinative Model 
(Equal Weights) 
Communicative
Model 
(PCA) 
     Communicative
Model 
(Equal Weights) 
Distal   Influence Variables: 
 
   
Property Rights  0.0789** 0.0825*** 0.0756**  0.0770** 0.0713** 0.0732** 
0.0254 0.0247 0.0262  0.0263 0.0295 0.0287 
Media Access of Politicians  0.585* 0.619* 0.722**  0.733** 0.675** 0.693** 
0.342 0.366 0.336  0.339 0.315 0.339 
Signed Petitions  0.0967* 0.0988* 0.0896*  0.0883* 0.0982 0.0993 
0.0531 0.0529 0.0518  0.0521 0.0612 0.0622 
Attended Demonstrations  ‐0.0720** ‐0.0759** ‐0.0739**  ‐0.0736** ‐0.0694** ‐0.0719** 
  0.0263 0.0251 0.0284  0.0282 0.0309 ‐.0306 
Proximate  Index_PPG4_Formal 
Coordination 
0.943**    
0.347    
Index_PPG4_ Formal 
Coordination (ew) 
1.929**    
0.725    
Index_PPG4_Informal 
Coordination 
0.845**   
0.33   
Index_PPG4_ Formal 
Coordination (ew) 
  1.699**  
  0.658  
Index_PPG4_Policy 
Communication 
  0.806**  
  0.268  
Index_PPG4_ Policy 
Communication (ew) 
  1.720*** 
    0.523 
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  cut1 14.59*** 15.49*** 14.77***  15.00*** 13.54*** 14.34*** 
  _cons 3.111 3.911 2.944  3.057 2.979 3.184 
  cut2 20.19*** 21.34*** 20.34***  20.66*** 18.63*** 19.78*** 
  _cons 4.152 5.114 3.972  4.113 3.974 4.248 
  cut3 22.22*** 23.46*** 22.14***  22.49*** 20.30*** 21.51*** 
  _cons 4.411 5.461 4.149  4.302 3.992 4.283 
  cut4 23.41*** 24.70*** 23.27***  23.62*** 21.43*** 22.66*** 
  _cons 4.602 5.691 4.301  4.452 4.098 4.387 
  cut5 27.00*** 28.31*** 26.31***  26.68*** 25.19*** 26.45*** 
  _cons 4.666 5.836 4.225  4.371 4.915 5.118 
  cut6 30.27*** 31.52*** 29.65***  30.01*** 28.60*** 29.96*** 
  _cons 5.586 6.769 4.996  5.156 5.738 6.029 
  Member States  28 28 28  28 28 28 
  omodel: Approximate 
likelihood‐ratio test of 
proportionality of odds 
across response categories: 
chi2(25) =     29.65 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2376 
chi2(25) =     31.93 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1600 
chi2(25) =     27.80 Prob > 
chi2 =    0.3173 
chi2(25) =    27.76 
Prob > chi2 =    0.3190 
chi2(25) =     32.95 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1324 
chi2(25) =     26.47 
Prob > chi2 =0.3831 
 
 
Standard errors below coefficients  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001, ew: equal weights PCA: Principal Component Analysis 
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